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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HICHAHD C. PEEPLES, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. I 
· Case No. 
ELLIOTT 'YOLFE, RICHARD L. 10537 
:1IcGlLLlS and "~OLFE'S SPORTS-) 
JlA~'S HEADQUARTERS, a Co-
partnership, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE:\IENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case is an appeal from a permanent injunction 
issued against appellants, in an action brought for an 
injunction and for an accounting and damages. 
DISPOSITION BELU\V 
The question of damages having been reserved, the 
defendant's appeal from an injunction issued in re-
spondent's farnr. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent prays for affinnance of tlir 
order below. 
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts is substantialii 
correct except as to the following obserrntions: 
The respondent has engaged in a small, well knoll'': 
and personalized sporting goods business in Salt Lakt 
City for many years. The respondent, having been a 
partner in "Al's Sporting Goods" from 1946 (R. 18/, 
purchased the entire interest in 1957 ( R. 18), when tht 
only other partner died. The respondent continued as 
a sole proprietor in the operation of "Al's Sporting 
Goods" until, because of business adversity, he was 
compelled to execute an assignment for the benefit of 
his creditors. 
As to respondent's indicated intent, insofar as it 
purports to express that the trade name and good will 
were expressly transferred under the assignment for 
the benefit of creditors, (Ex. 1; See Appellants' Briel 
at 5, 6) the reply on cross examination should be viewed 
in the context of the complete record on that point. 
Respondent expressly stated that he would not sell the 
trade name (Tr. 59). 
After the assignment, the assignee advertised for 
bids in order to liquidate the inventory and fixtures m 
2 
·,f ·tion of creditor's claims. The notice sent to pros-
sat1s ac " . . 
·iective purchasers stated that bids will be accepted for 
~]] assets or separate offers on the merchandise and 
,. t 
1
.,,s " 1\.ppellants, in response to the notice, nx u L· ••.•• 
sulnnitted the high bid for '' ... the merchandise inven-
~ory ::ind fixtures of Al's Sporting Goods, signed, 
"Eliott \Yolfe' " (Ex. P-20, Tr. 130). Appellants, 
heini:,· high bidders, received a bill of sale from the 
;;ssiguee. listing only ''furniture, fixtures and merchan-
ilise a~ per inventory list attached . . . " ( R. 11-a). 
The assignee retained an automobile used in respond-
enfc business (Tr. 61), and accounts receivable listed 
at $25,300.00 ( R. 11 ; Tr. 53, 54!) , neither of which 
were bid on by the appellants. 
After acquiring the inventory and fixtures, appel-
lant Wolfe, by his own testimony stated "I didn't know 
what I was going to do" (Tr. 126). On cross exami-
nation appellant further testified: 
"Q. You didn't know ... whether you were go-
ing to take the merchandise down to 'Volfe's 
or what?" 
A. ''That's correct" (Tr. 126). 
Subsequently, the appellants reopened respondent's 
place of business, and held themselves out to the public 
as "Al's Sporting Goods" (R. 19, 20). Upon receipt 
of notice and complaint from respondent that the above 
course of action was unauthorized, appellants acquired 
a "quit claim" bill of sale from the assignee which pur-
ported to transfer " ... all of the right, title and interest 
3 
which it (assignee for benefit of creditors) acqu· d 
ll'e to 
the trade name ... " ( R. 12). 
Appellants continued to hold themselves out to tlif 
public as "Al's Sporting Goods," both through their 
ostensible management of the business and bv exp \ • re) 
advertising in local newspapers (R. 20, Ex. D. 13. 
14, 15 and 16). The advertising itself was in all respecll 
identical in form to the advertising used by respondent 
At this point in time, respondent brought suit 1
11 
enjoin appellants' use of the trade name. Equitable 
relief was granted in respondent's favor, but not until 
the end of the Christmas mercantile season on or aboul 
December 24, 1965 (R. 21). At about this time appeJ. 
lants had advertised "a quiting business sale," inform· 
ing the general public that "Al's Sporting Goods'' was 
quitting for good. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RESPONDENT HAS THE 
RIGHT OF SOLE ENJOYMENT AND USE 
OF THE TRADE NAME "AL'S SPORTING 
GOODS." 
A. The N aturc of Respondent's Ownership. 
'Ve are not dealing in property law conceptualizim. 
A purported transfer does not and cannot transfer 
"ownership." Rather, what is required is a transfer ol 
that which will give a right of protection to the t~ans· 
feree so that he may reap the rewards of the busmes! 
4 
"good will," or the "expectation of custom" which a 
trade name symbolizes. If such a transfer is effective, 
it follows that the transferee may enjoin its use by 
others. That he must prove the transfer was effective 
is the crux of the problem and not that he must establish 
a "chain of title." 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Beech-
Sut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 
632, (1927), (Per Holmes, J.) expresses the nature 
Jf the right to protection of one who "has" a trade name: 
" ... in a qualified sense the mark is property, 
protected and alienable, although as with other 
property its outline is shown only by the law 
of torts, of which the right is a prophetic sum-
mary.'' 
vVhat the owner has is an expectancy (in over-
simplified terms), an expectation that there will be a 
continued "habit of patronage." 
The sole question presently before this Court is 
whether the trial court erred in its finding that the 
appellants acquired no interest in respondent's trade 
name by virtue of their purchase of the inventory and 
fixtures of "Al's Sporting Goods." 
Respondent respectfully contends that the general 
assignment was not intended to be, and never was 
effective, to "transfer" the trade name. Further, the 
"transfer" would not be legally effectual even if re-
spondent had expressly intended to, and did, transfer 
the trade name. 
5 
That the wrongful use of a trade name ma., 
enjoined and the rightful owner of the trade nam ) ri: 
e COfJJ· 
pensated when he has suffered damage, cannot b e qut1 
tioned. This Court has so ruled. Security Title 1 n., 
Agency v. Security 11itle Ins. Co., 15 Utah 2d 93, 3i. 
P.2d 691 (1964); Budget System, Inc. v. Bud,getL1J
11 
and Finance Plan, 12 Gtah 2d 18, 361 P.2d 512 (196J, 
B. 1'he General Assignmc1lt JVas Not E.ffectite, 
Transfer Respondent's Trade Name. 
Appellant's contention that the general assignmem 
for the benefit of creditors effectively transferred tht 
trade name is unwarranted both in reason and authority 
The express terms of the assignment are not li1 
dispute. A perusal of those terms indicates that what 
was transferred were respondent's physical asseh, 
those convertible to cash and distributible to respona· 
ent's creditors (Ex. 1). Such is the purpose of a genera! 
assignment for the benefit of creditors. See UTAH Com 
ANNOTATED, 1953, § § 6-1-1, et, seq. 
'¥here current assets are named with particularity. 
and a savings clause is appended assigning " ... a!~ 
other chattels of every name, nature and description 
... " the transferor cannot be said to have transferreu 
his entire interest. The use of the word "chattels" can 
hardly be deemed to embrace the trade name or go<l11 
will. 
Appellant relies on cases where the language 01 
the assignment purported to convey "all property" 
6 
(Dr. s. A. Richmownd N ~~·vine Co. v. Richm~nd, 159 
FS. 293, 296 ( 189.:>), or all property and effects ... 
ifieaeman & Co. v. Hegeman, 8 Daley 1 (N. Y. Com-
\ b " 
mon pleas, 1880) ) , or ... property, and effects of 
ererY kin<l ... " ( llai)k of Tomah v. 'Varren, 94 'Vis. 
151,.68 ~.,V. 549 (1896) ). These decisions are clearly 
distinguishable. 
~ ot only was the language of assignment in the 
above cases mueh broader than " ... all other chattels 
' . ~ ,. but two further elements were met: First, in 
every ease allowing such a transfer, the court found 
ri necessary element of non-deception; and, secondly, 
the business itself, as a going concern, must have been 
the subject-matter of the transfer in order to include 
the trade name, or trade mark. 
POINT II. SINCE THE TRADE N Al\IE 
WAS PERSON AL ITS USE MAY BE EN-
JOINED EYEX IF THE GENERAL ASSIGN-
)IENT PCRPORTED TO OPERATE AS A 
TR.Al~"S:FER. 
The trade name has value, under the facts at bar, 
only ( 1) by respondent's future use thereof, or (2) 
by appellants' actual piracy and use to their own benefit. 
Under different facts, a trade mark or trade name 
may haw market value standing alone and could be 
sold singularly to a high bidder or a creditor. Such was 
the case in Let·enthal v. Ollie Morris Equip. Co., 184 
Cal. App. 2d 553, 7 Cal. Rept'r 911 ( 1960), and in sim-
7 
ilar cases where a sale has been recognized th t 
" e rad, 
name or mark was of a non personal" nature. 
In Falk v. American West Indies Tradinc 1·, 
,/ LJ 
180 N.Y. 445, 73 N.E. 239 (1905), the user of am, ar1, 
in connection with the manufacture of cigars purporteil 
to assign the mark to another upon going out of bu,
1 
ness. The assignee of the mark used it as it had beei 
used before without making any indication that he had 
succeeded the original user. Subsequently a third partr 
began using a similar mark. The assignee sought pr~­
tection in equity, but he was denied relief because the 
transfer was found ineffective. The court pertinentlr 
states: 
"There is no allegation, proof, or finding u1 
this case that the plaintiffs, upon the executioli 
of the writing referred to or at any other time, 
succeeded in any way to the business of the as· 
signor or any part of it, or to the good will to 
which up to that time the trade mark had been 
attached. It was, as already suggested, simpl~ 
a written transfer of the naked trade mark ana 
labels detached from the business in which it 
had been theretofore used, and when used by the 
plaintiffs no longer denoted or distinguished the 
article or business to which it had been attachea. 
We do not say that the principle above suggesteo 
would apply to an assignment of all trade mark\ 
made in a similar way. There are doubtle~s, so~e 
trade marks that consist of words that 1dent1fy 
an article produced by some secret process ana 
without the use of which the article could no: 
be described. In other words, the name used ma; 
be inherent in the article itself and is not use 
8 
·is in this case to distinguish one cigar from an-
~ther. The celebrated cordial, which is in use 
the world over, known as 'Chartreuse' is a sample 
of a trade mark, the bare assignment of which 
might confer upon the assignee the right to man-
qfadure and sell that article. Other examples 
might be cited that would_ not come within the 
rule above suggested, but m the case at bar the 
tradt mark was originally adopted by the Lich-
tensteins to distinguish a cigar manufactured 
by themsefres. The trade mark in their hands 
r~presented the_ir own article, their own skill a~1d 
business experience. \Vhen used by the plam-
tiffs in their business it does not truly denote 
anything of the kind and the plaintiffs' claim 
really is that they liave acquired the right to 
sell their own goods as the goods of someone 
else" (73 N.E. 239, at 451). 
If respondent, in the instant case, expressly had 
made reference to his trade name in the assignment 
and if the appellants had held themselves out to the 
consuming public as having become the successor of 
the original user of the trade name, then the facts might 
support appellants' view. Such is not the case, even 
assuming that the trade name were non-personal and, 
hence, assignable. 
'Vhere the trade name connotes a reference to the 
goods, and the quality of the goods do not depend on 
the skill or trust of the person preparing or selling the 
same, then free and separate transferability is generally 
recognized. This is because there is no consequent public 
deception. On the other hand, if the truthful conno-
tation disappears after the purported transfer, the 
9 
transferee invariably will. be enjoined from its futu: 
use, and, the transfer will be found ineffective. T 
truthful connotation disappears entirely in cases wh:; 
the trade name has been deemed "personal." 
A personal element may exist in good will of ai. 
kind, and this element does not pass to a purch.h 
or assignee of the business. The Alabama court 
I. 
discussing the sale of a cafe, said that the person, 
presence, reputation, management and manner of tu• 
seller may have contributed to the creation of the gooi; 
will attached to the caf e. The court cogently remarkea: 
"Now, on a sale, in the nature of things, this personal 
element is withdrawn. The purchaser takes the resulh 
of past endeavors in building a business, which he j, 
entitled to take as it is, but unaided by the continuini 
services of the seller. The personal experience, skill 
and reputation of the seller remains his, and canno! 
pass as a part of the good will of the business.'' Col/~1 
v. Brown, 211 Ala. 443, 100 So. 769, 770 (1924). In 
this case the instrument of conveyance recites " ... 
all leases, goods, wares, merchandise, good will ana 
paraphenalia therewith connected," of the American 
Cafe. 
The rule is likewise well stated in I Nims, L'nfair 
Competition and Trade Marks, 4th Ed., p. 96: 
"The good will attached to certain trades or 
professions of certain types is not transferrable 
as where it depends entirely upon the p~rsonal 
reputation art skill and experience of its ere· 
' ' . t d a tor and owner, and is connected and assoc1a e 
10 
with him alone and with his name. Such good 
will cannot be assigned and does not survive 
tile owner. * * * This rule applies not only to 
the personal, family name of the owner of ~he 
<Tood ,rill, but also to a trade name under wl11ch 
he practiced his profession. . . . " 
ln Bufl'olo 0,l}:ster Co. v. Nenno, 132, .Misc. 213, 
~~fl X.Y. Supp. :ZIO ( 1U:28), ~Ir. Nenno entered into 
the fishing business and continued in the trade for 
many years. For financial reasons he was forced to 
mah a general assignment of his assets. The stock in 
trade was sold to the lluff alo Oyster Co., Inc. Shortly 
after Buffalo ·s purchase of the stock the assignee for 
benefit of creditors executed a second written instru-
ment describing "the good will of Nenno and Co., Inc." 
and it was delivered to the plaintiff (not unlike the in-
stant case). The court, in determining the right of Buffa-
lo Oyster Co. to enjoin the use of the trade name, square-
ly based its decision on the rights obtained by the plain-
tiff by Yirtue of the conveyance from the assignee. The 
court reasoned that where N enno's transfer was invol-
untary, he is free to ·'again establish himself in a similar 
business to solicit his old customers" (229 N.Y. Supp. 
213). Since the selection or handling of seafood involved 
an element of skill, experience and reputation upon 
which consumers relied, the court concluded that the 
assignee of the good will could not use the name. The 
court said that, " ... l we] will not permit a name or 
good will to be used to mislead the public as to whom 
they are dealing with, when it would be to their injury 
to deal with one other than the one with whom they 
11 
inte~ded t~ deal" (citing 'Vorld's Dispensary .Medit 
Assn v. Pierce, 203 N.Y. 419, 96 N.E. 738 (lgl! 
The court further observed that the public interest Ii 
involved because " ... they have come to rely up 
1
' on, 
skill and experience and his reputation and that the, 
factors were known to the public and were a potfc 
factor in bringing the business of the public to fr 
defendant." 
It is not the actual use of a given name which. 
essential to assert the protection sought in the instaff 
case, but rather the association reasonably made by tni 
public between an individual lawfully using the tra~1 
name and the name itself. In Reconstruction Financi 
Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 22 F. Supp, Ji~ 
(D.N.Y. 1938), the court observed as follows: "Even 
the name of a person can acquire a meaning of Joni 
association with the product so that the use of the name 
unexplained with another similar product will have tbe 
effect of deception .... Descriptive words may acquire 
by use a secondary significance which is susceptible 
of ownership and entitled to protection in equity" 1:~ 
F, Supp. 180, 183). 
In cases recognizing a transfer, the key guideline 
is the exact nature of the trade name's purpose, i.e)hat 
which make its valuable. 
The factor which we must keep in view is that 
trade marks and trade names serve various purPose~ 
The only common factor is that they give rise .~ a 
"habit of patronage." Various factors, in turn, givmg 
12 
· to this "habit of patronage," may include in any rise 
combination, (a) matter of place, (b) matter of the 
erson dealt with, or ( c) matter of particular name 
~r to goods with a certain mark, without regard to any 
other factor, because the goods have been found satis-
factory. 
An analysis of the cases on this point clearly shows 
that the question of transferability turns on the various 
functions of the mark or name. The key to the problem 
then turns on the consideration "will the consuming 
public be deceived?" 
In every case analyzed by appellants, where decep-
tion was likely, the transfer was prohibited or not 
recognized. This key concept was also recognized by 
the trial judge below ( Tr. I I 0) . 
The test, then, as to whether the truthful conno-
tation disappears after the purported transfer, turns 
on an analysis of the facts in each case. Clearly, where 
the trade name has been used throughout the years so 
that it connotes an identification with a particular 
person, or identifies satisfactory past experience by 
that person or through his efforts, or through his agents, 
then we may deem the trade name "personal." This 
is the common thread of the cases analyzed in appel-
lants' brief. See 87 C.J.S., Trade Marks, Trade Names 
and Unfair Competition, § I7I, p. 503. 
This concept is analagous to "secondary meaning," 
in the law of trade names and unfair competition gene-
13 
rally. To be entitled to protection, words in 
1 . . a .r111, 
name which are ~erely generic or geographical mu, 
become an embodiment of the owner's reputati' on a1,. 
service. In Security Title Irus. Agency ., l'e , · 
"" u cur11 
Title Ins. Co., supra, this Court held that the , , 
\\Q)ij. 
"Security Title" had a "secondary meaning" and hu 
become synonymous with the originator and princ,~ 1 
stockholder as if his given name had appeared in r!i 
name of the business (387 P.2d at 693). 
The respect to which the concepts of "persona, 
trade names'' and ''secondary meaning'' differ is largeli 
factual in application. The ideas upon which thes: 
concepts rest, i.e. ( 1) to prevent fraud and deceptio~ 
to the public, and ( 2) to protect the true owner a, 
being the beneficiary of his life efforts, produce tilt 
same result. 
In the Security Title case, supra, the emphasis I, 
fund in prevention of an outsider's use, or "pirating 
of the name. In our case, the question is also whether 
or not the name could be transferred, even if the !rut 
beneficiary desired to do so. Whether or not it coufo 
be so transferred is dependent, as we have seen, on tl1t 
resulting deception to the consumers in the area. Tllb 
question was decided below in respondent's favor, up0n 
clear evidence fully justifying the conclusion reacheii 
by the court. 
That the respondent, either personally or thro~gi: 
his agents, contributed a large amount of personahzeu 
service and advice cannot be disputed; the appe!lanli 
14 
nwn statement of facts would so indicate (See appel-
lants' brief at 2, 3, and 4). Indeed, this may point to 
. me of the contributing factor of respondent's busi-,o 
ness losses. The smaller, more "personalized" sporting 
uoods stores apparently did not carry the sales volume 
~ecessary to compete with the larger "department 
store" sporting goods stores in the Salt Lake City area 
(Tr. 52), 
Certainly, the reputation and good will which a 
trade name symbolizes may mean more than merely 
the name brands of goods available at any particular 
place. If the product of respondent's life efforts, through 
advising his customers, "which length ski," or"what 
kind of shotgun," or that "they have been catching fish 
ou this lure rather than that lure," has value at all, such 
value is bound up on the connotation "Al's Sporting 
Goods." 
Appellants cannot argue with the trial court's find-
ing that " ... use by defendants of the trade name 
'Al's Sporting Goods' is wrongful and unlawful ... " 
( R. 21) , and that " . . . [such use] was, therefore, 
wrongful and misled the public and plaintiff's custo-
mers . . . " ( R. 21 ) . 
The foregoing conclusions are not illagical, as 
appellant contends, but are express findings that lead 
to the ultimate decision of the case. That is, the trade 
name "Al's Sporting Goods" has substantial value in 
the market place to either the respondent, or to anyone 
else. Bnt, its Yalue in the hands of any person other 
15 
than respondent depends solely on having pot , ent11 
customers confuse the other person's business wit! tJ·, 
l I" 
of the respondent's. The conclusion follows that 
1
, 
spondent is the only person in the Salt Lake Cit; art 
entitled to be protected in the use of the trade. nani 
"Al's Sporting Goods." 
In a New York case, In re Adams, 24 Mise L1J:, 
53 N.Y. Supp. 666 (1898), the court, dealing 11 j1 
almost identical facts, enjoined the assignee for i1: 
benefit of creditors from selling an alleged trade mar,, 
with the other assets, stating: "If his name is of ralut 
as a trade mark, it was made so by the skill and energ! 
with which he associated the name in his conduct of tlit 
business prior to the assignment. If it shall now forever 
be transferred to a stranger to be used, by an involWJ· 
tary transfer so far as Robert Adams is concerned. 
and alone by force of an assignment of the name D) 
the general assignee, whose duty ends with the con· 
version of the property of the assignor into money for 
the payment of debts, then we have the case of a stranger 
using a name not associated with his own business soH 
by force of the assignment, while the assignor himseli 
is debarred forever from using his own name in hi1 
future efforts to retirieve his fortunes .... " 
POINT III. A TRADE N Al\IE OR TRADE 
l\iIARK IS IN SEP ARABLE FROM THE GOOD 
WILL OF A BUSINESS, AND CANNOT BE 
TRANSFERRED EXCEPT WITH THE BPS!· 
NESS ITSELF. 
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The facts of the instant case show a purchase by 
11 ts of stock in trade, inventory and fixtures :ippe an . . 
. the assignee for benefit of creditors. Other assets, 
tram . 
. l d'ng a yehicle and accounts receivable, were not 
inc u 1 ' 
. f i·red There is no eYidence whatever that would trans e · 
ort the proposition that the business, as a going supp . 
C-ei·ri was transferred or sold to appellants. Of con , 
course, no mention was made either in the offer of 
purchase or the conveyance of sale to the trade name 
:1r good will of respondent's business (Tr. 138, Ex. P. 
20)' 
With respect to the severability of the trade name 
(good will) from the business itself, I Nims, Unfair 
Competition & Trade Marks, Supra, § 17 at 85, ob-
serves: "Good will may not be sold or transferred 
separate from the business with which it is associated; 
and a trade mark or trade name cannot be transferred 
separate from the good will which it represents. There-
fore, a trade mark or name may not be transferred 
except with the business of which it is the outward 
sign." See also JfocMahan Formacle Co. v. Denver 
Chemical Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 468, 474 (8th Cir., 1901). 
In Ward Chandler Bldg. Co. v. CaUlwell, 8 Cal. 
App. 2d 375, 47 P.2d 758 ( 1935), the Hudgen's did 
business as "Hudgen's Permanent '1Vave Shop" and 
thereafter sold the business, including the trade mark, 
to the defendant l\:1ildred Caldwell. Later, plaintiff 
secured a judgment against Caldwell for rent and had 
a receiver appointed to take the interest of the defend-
17 
ant and the good will and trade mark of the "F d 
lU ge1 
Permanent 'V ave Shop" and to sell the same. T 
phinciple issue was whether or not the trade name ,~l 
trade mark could be sold or assigned except in tll' 
nection with the sale of the business. The court ob· .· 
\tflt 
that under the circumstances of the case a proper 
right attached to the name which the law would rer·n, 
nize and protect and that it cannot exist separately fr,,' 
the business to which it belongs and with which 1[ 
identified, it not being a species of property and carn
1
,, 
be sold and transferred as such. The Court obsmt: 
that the trade mark in issue was personal and from,, 
inception that it " . . . indicated to the public tti, 
the personal care and skill of the Hudgen's were em 
cised in producing the goods and rendering the smicr 
sold." 
The California court further reasons that," . .. u 
the bare right of user could be transferred, the naJ!t 
or mark would no longer serve to point out and protec 
the business with which it has become identified, or !11 
secure the public against deception, but would ten: 
to give a different business the benefit of the reputatiot 
established by the business to which the name had prt 
viously been applied" ( 47 P.2d at 760). The cou: 
recognized that, " ... the general rule is that a persorni 
trade mark or trade name is not assignable." The coun 
then stated that there is but one exception to the r~t 
They said, "an exception to the general rule has beei 
made where the mark or name has been so employ~i 
as to be deprived of its personal nature and has com 
18 
I J~, 
r!. 
fl' ,. 
'ii! 
~I] 
JL 
't· 
n 
d. te that goods bearing it are of a certain stand-to m ica . . 
d kind or quality or are made m a certam manner 
ar , l ,, 
or after a certain formu a. 
This essentially is the same line of reasoning adopted 
bv the New York court in Falk v. American West 
l;idies Tradiny Co., supra, and is the basic under-
pinning for the California decision allowing a ~rade 
mark's existence separate and apart from the busmess. 
See Leventhal v. Ollie Morris Equip. Co., supra. 
I Nims, Unfair Competition & Trade Marks, supra, 
) 18. at 96, speaks of breaking the continuity of business 
reputations upon which customers are likely to reply. 
"The common law has long forbidden naked assignment 
or other transfers or trade symbols independently of 
the good will which they represent, because such trans-
actions are likely to break the continuity of reputation 
and thus, deception of those who have come to rely on 
such trade marks and symbols and a good will which 
they represent." 
In Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & Jor<lan Mill 
& Elevator Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 Pac. 731 ( 1921), 
the plaintiff sought an injunction, asserting the wrong-
ful use of his trade mark. The defendant operated two 
milling plants, one in North Salt Lake and the other 
in South Jordan. The parties entered into an agreement 
whereby the defendant agreed to sell the North Salt 
Lake plant to the plaintiff. The conveyance described 
the buildings and improvements. The plaintiff, after 
the sale, undertook to use the trade name and trade 
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mark of the defendant describing its products as"\\' , 
F " fl b d Th li1i awn our ran . e court held the terms of t , raJl\1,, 
did not include the trade mark and to hold sue! . · 
produce difficulty which "might lead to di·~ 11
1
°u:,:, 
~a~ ro~. 
results." The court observed further that ;f , t ' a ]''111 
mark is expressly transferred it must be done · ,, ' 
by acquiring the good will of the business in connec;[
1
,,, 
with which the trade mark is used, and of which ii 
1 
a part. Where it has been held that the trade mart 
passed, the vendee has always acquired the gou<l wi' 
of the business purchased, and, as a general rule, tli 
vendor has retired from the business." 
The foregoing cases recognize two separate grounGi 
for not giving effect to an assignment or transfer of a 
business trade name. That the consuming public is at· 
ceived is one factor, and is the subject matter of respond· 
ent's Point II, supra. The second, and independentfar· 
tor, is the recognition of the true owner's right to prater·' 
tion of his life-time effort, or "work product," in thecoll1' 
pensatory sense. In Budget System, Inc. v BudrH' 
Loan & Finance Plan, supra, the plaintiff successful!r 
enjoined the defendant corporation's use of the narm 
"Budget." This court said that there is an apparen: 
"desire in defendant to appear as plaintiff for Int 
purpose of benefiting from the good will and reputatiotr 
which plaintiff claimed it had developed over the yeaN 
... " ( 12 Utah 2d at 21). The court also recognizeO 
the element of public deception where customers ma) 
buy "in reliance upon a name, reputation, brand,··, 
20 
b P
urchases what has theretofore pleased him. 
a uyer ~f because of a similation as to one . . . of those 
fe~tures, he gets something different ... it may truly 
be said that he has been defrauded" ( 12 Utah 2d at 21). 
But, in the Budqet case it was assumed, arguendo, 
that there was no fraud. Thus, the basis for affirmance 
rests primarily on the principle of protecting plaintiff's 
rights rather than benefiting the public by protecting 
them from fraud. 
Judge Learned Hand in Ernerson Elec. Mfg. Co. 
v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908 
(2d. Cir. 1939) spoke of the varied interests involved 
in a trade name infringement case, including the inter-
est of the owner in sales of the product by the infringer. 
The other interest was described as fallows: 
"The other interest is the plaintiff's general 
reputation which goes with his name. Buyers 
from the putative wrongdoer may also buy from 
the plaintiff, and many confuse the two; the 
plaintiff will not wish to expose his reputation 
to the chances of the wrongdoer's conduct of his 
business" (105 F.2d 108, 110). 
Judge Hand goes on to reason that the interests, though 
contingent, are substantial enough to justify protection. 
Obviously, his reasoning depends on the element of 
deception, or at least the chance of possible mistakes 
by the public. However, by his reasoning, the right of 
protection runs to the true owner of the mark or name, 
and not to the public in general. 
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POINT IV. RESPONDENT CANNOT B' 
DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED R, 
TRADE NA.ME BECAUSE OF FINANCI~li 
DIFFICULTIES 'VHICH CAUSED BI;ir 'J, 
SUSPEND OPERATIONS. 
'Vhether the respondent can be deemed to ]~, 
abandoned his trade name would depend upon all, 
the evidence relating to the manner in which the hu,
1 
ness operation was suspended, whether he transferrt 
the trade name and whether subsequent events make 
impossible for him to resume business in his trade nami 
"Al's Sporting Goods" is an honored name ml~ 
business signified, and the plaintiff, by his special anii 
unusual skill, knowledge and reputation, made thena 
a valuable and inseparable part of himself, and it ma!~ 
no difference that the business has been suspendea k 
his insolvency because his trade name " ... is his capifa 
for a new beginning." Mattingly v. Stone, 12 Ky,l 
Rep. 72, 14 S.W. 47 (1890). 
The mere suspension of business operations becau•, 
of financial difficulties does not support the contentio: 
that respondent abandoned his trade name (see anrn· 
tation, 3 A.L.R. 2d, 1226, at 1246, and cases cit~ 
therein). 
In a suit to enjoin trade name infringement ih 
the "trade," and the "bare-name," which must~. 
totally and irrevocably abandoned in any event. Tl 
R.F.C., a government agency, became the ownerol 
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ubstantial part of a shoe manufacturing business by 
s. t of its secured interest when the business de-nr ue · 
faulted on its loan payments. The R.F.C. paid a 
separate consideration to the trustee in bankruptcy 
f " real estate, fixtures, machinery, ... equipment, or .. · 
all trade marks, together with the good will of the 
business ... and such right as the bankrupt had to use 
the name ( s ) . . · · " 
R..F.C., not being able to sell the entire business, 
as a going concern, began liquidating the assets to 
separate purchasers. The bankrupt, some six years 
later, began manufacturing shoes under the same trade 
names. "Arch-Aid" and ".Menihan." R.F.C., not yet 
having sold some of the bankrupt company's assets, 
including the trade marks and trade names, brought 
suit to enjoin the original owner's use. Held, on the 
merits, the complaint should be dismissed. Reconstruc-
tionFinance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 28 F. Supp. 
920 (D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 312 U.S. 81 (1941). Thus, 
after some six years in time after their financial prob-
lems. the original owners were allowed to begin anew, 
using the same trade name. The court reasoned that 
R.F.C., did not abandon the trade names because it 
never acquired them, thus avoiding the question of 
separating the ''going concern" from the "trade name" 
in gross. The court did, however, recognize the rule 
that: 
. ".The sole function of a trade mark being to 
md1cate the origin or ownership of the goods, it 
23 
cannot exist a part from the business t 
its use is incident." 0 wn, 
The Supreme Court of the United States · B 
lll f'1' 
Nut Packing Co. v. Lorillard Co., Supra, has held![, 
abandonment can only be shown where the 
1
· 1 .. neut 
of the owner is clear and unequivocal but ·i·I ' ' 1ere 1. 
intention to abandon is not clear, no abandonment, 
be found. See also E. I. du Pont de Nemoun H 
v. Celanese Corp .. 167 F. 2d 484 ( 1948). 
The instant case is devoid of evidence of an inte 
tion to abandon plaintiff's trade name, and in theabse~, 
of some express intention to do so, such an intenn 
cannot be inf erred. 
CONCLUSION 
The question presented is whether or not, 1,1ne: 
the bare right to use a trade name is allegedly Ira~ 
ferred, will such a transfer give a different busim· 
the benefit of the reputation established by the busli1r 
to which it has become a synonym, and in deception 
the public? 
Such a question is largely a problem of fact11 
analysis under the different circumstances of differr: 
cases. The trial court below, as the only logical conclv 
sion from its findings, determined the question in fa 11 • 
of the respondent. 
Such a decision, supported by clear evidence,~· 
24 
rdance with all reasoned authority. It is also a deci-acco 
sion which respondent respectfully requests this court 
to affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'VILLIAM G. FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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